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Abstract 
This Article aims to reimagine post-national legal solidarity. It does so by bringing debates over 
Habermasian constitutional theory to bear on the evolving use of mutual recognition and mutual trust 
in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), particularly in the context of European asylum 
law and reforms to the Dublin Regulation. Insofar as critiques of Habermasian “constitutional patriotism” 
apply to the principle of mutual trust, the Article suggests why post-national solidarity requires fallibilism 
and dynamic responsiveness that exceed formalized rules of forbearance and respect. 
On this revised view, legal solidarity guarantees a particular form of adjudication through which indi-
vidual litigants in a particular case challenge the transnational structural conditions that give rise to 
individual harm. Because it acknowledges that violations of individual rights are always potentially 
or in part the result of a collective systemic failure, this conception of solidarity restores meaning to 
the transformative “transfer” of sovereignty that post-national law had promised. In the field of asylum 
law, I detail how this application of solidarity would offer a much-needed corrective to structural 
imbalances in the existing Dublin regime. I conclude with reflections on the principle’s application  
in additional fields of EU law, as well. 
Keywords: Solidarity; post-national law; constitutional patriotism; mutual trust; Dublin Regulation 
A. Constitutional Imagination, Solidarity, and the Matter of Self-Critique 
When Czech President Václav Havel returned in 2000 to speak before the European Parliament, 
he directed criticism to the adequacy of the European Union’s cosmopolitan and universalist 
aspirations. Havel’s concern was the immanent enlargement of the EU toward the East, which 
would soon include his own Czech Republic. The question of enlargement for Havel meant a 
confrontation with new horizons for the EU’s own self-understanding.1 
He knew the incorporation of post-socialist states and their citizens, were they to be true equals 
in partnership, would require the European Union to confront much more forthrightly than it had 
before questions of identity, shared responsibility, and social justice across areas of very uneven 
economic development and distinct historical experience. In light of the 1999 NATO intervention 
in Kosovo and Serbia and the preceding turbulent acceptance in the mid-1990s of refugees from 
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University), a J.D. (Yale Law School), and a Bachelor of Arts in Social Studies (Harvard University). 
1This point is well articulated in Seyla Benhabib & Stefan Eich, Restructuring Democracy and the Idea of Europe, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPEAN THOUGHT (W. Breckman & P. Gordon eds., 2019). 
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distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits 
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the former Yugoslavia, such questions would also prompt the European Union to consider its own 
commitments to the world—and to the world’s inherent and shifting plurality. 
Recalling his previous address to the European Parliament in 1994, Havel drew parallels between 
the need to confront such questions and the dwindling legitimacy of Europe’s functionalist mode of 
technical and economic integration. If questions of value and identity became subjects for European 
integration only belatedly, it was because such matters seemed self-evidently clear after the horrors of 
the Second World War, Havel argued. And similarly, the meaning of “Europeanism” had become a 
question only belatedly because it, too, had deceptively come “so naturally.”2 But in the same way the 
EU’s functionalist constitution privileging a liberalized common market has in time proven 
inadequate,3 so too have the seemingly “natural” perceptions of European self-understanding. 
“[I]f Europe has thought so little about its own identity in the past,” Havel said, “that is no doubt 
because it considered itself, wrongly, to be the entire world; or at least it considered itself to be better 
than the rest of the world, because it did not feel the need to define itself in relation to others.”4 
For Havel, there was a connection between finding an alternative to European functionalist law 
and recovering the meaning of one’s solidarity with others. The coming Eastern enlargement for 
Havel would require the European Union to think more carefully about how a deeper and new 
array of divergent histories, socioeconomic structures, and political expectations among states 
could be integrated in an overarching solidaristic commitment to continue living together. 
It would press the issue of which kinds of difference and diversity would be tolerated, which values 
and preferences would be accepted, and which would not. 
But Havel’s concern was not merely to secure accommodation of Eastern and Central Europe in 
the already established legal space of the European Union. His vision of solidarity was more subtle 
and reflexive; it entailed a mutual encounter. In pointing to the naturalizing insularity of 
“Europeanism,” Havel connected the external dimensions of recognition among states with a process 
of internal critique within them. Solidarity here entails reaching out but also reaching in—reflection 
on one’s external obligations but also reflection on one’s internal presumptions of identity, authority, 
and self-understanding. To invoke Europe’s solidarity—following Havel’s line  of thought—is 
inevitably an act of self-critical imagination. It is to call to mind other possibilities, other kinds 
of relationships with one’s own society and with others, and new responsibilities to the world. 
One is reminded here of Giorgio Agamben’s submission that only when “the citizen has been 
able to recognize the refugee that he or she is—only in such a world is the political survival of 
humankind today thinkable.”5 Agamben carries the figure of the refugee from its context in the 
laws of asylum to the heart of civic consciousness underpinning post-national law. In thinking 
through what is owed to the foreigner and the refugee, the citizen “clears the way” for new under-
6standings of nationality itself—and its potential for realizing solidarity anew. 
In this Article, I take inspiration from this idea—this connection we see, with Havel and 
Agamben, between post-national solidarity in Europe and critical imagination—and try to 
understand its consequences for European law and constitutional theory. Specifically, I aim to 
put forward a revised conception, in light of this philosophy, of solidarity as a legal principle. 
Theorists of European integration of course have long conceived the post-national civic 
relationship to be a product of law. Solidarity beyond the borders of the nation-state was to 
be a practical realization of the “integration through law” project, a set of sentiments and commit-
ments mediated by the form and force of legal agreement. Yet, in times of instability and crisis, 
European law has hardly secured such solidarity—for the social and economic freedoms of Greek 
2Václav Havel, Address before the European Parliament, Strasbourg, (Feb. 16, 2000). 
3See generally TURKULER ISIKSEL, EUROPE’S FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUTION: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE 
STATE (2016). 
4Havel, supra note 2. 
5GIORGIO AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END: NOTES ON POLITICS 25 (V. Binetti & C. Casarino trans., 2000). 
6Id. at 23. 
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citizens, for example, or the rights of refugees to safely seek asylum. These cases have seen, to the 
contrary, a punitive use of legalism to deny solidaristic politics. They are therefore paradoxical, 
poignant failures in need of explanation. Indeed, they suggest a serious limitation in the way 
European constitutional thought has imagined the constitutive links between solidarity and 
post-national law. 
Solidarity as a legal principle has been given erratic and skeptical treatment in European 
jurisprudence, deemed an elusive and limited tool to pursue fair and mutual obligations among 
EU Member States and citizens. Indeed, scholars have observed that the concept has prompted 
complex responses from national politics, some concerned specifically that post-national solid-
arity carries considerable ideological residue of neoliberal market pressures as the valence of 
its solidaristic commitment. After more ambitious use in earlier case law, the European Court 
of Justice, for its part, has applied the principle reluctantly—and vaguely where it has done so. 
The ECJ’s hesitance to give solidarity clear legal effect reflects the degree to which its meaning 
remains both politically contested and philosophically inscrutable. 
But this unsettled question of solidarity as a legal principle calls into question a key ambition of 
contemporary constitutional law: namely its role in social integration of a complex, pluralistic, and 
post-metaphysical polity. Because legality remains essential to the work of European integration in 
times of great diversity and instability, the relationship of solidarity to law in a post-national legal 
order merits greater scrutiny, perhaps revaluation. 
This Article develops theoretical steps toward such a revaluation. On my account, post-national 
solidarity requires a certain kind of legal recognition that reflects (a) terms of mutual dependency 
and mutual responsibility, and, just as importantly, (b) a dynamic responsiveness to how such 
responsibility evolves outside of one’s control and thus requires critical re-interpretation over 
time. This latter responsiveness requires accepting a higher order of self-critique and challenging 
the subtle ways one’s desire for mastery continues to set the terms for recognizing others. And 
while this second dimension is therefore essential to changing the manner in which sovereign 
political authority is exercised, it has also been the aspect of solidarity neglected by theorists 
of post-national and European constitutionalism. This is a salient reason, I argue, why existing 
understandings of solidarity have proven insufficiently attuned to the claims of excluded or 
marginalized others—whether fellow Member States or individuals—and have instead often 
reproduced unjustified hierarchies and inequalities. 
If, as Havel intimates, solidarity requires this responsiveness as a displacement of sovereign 
control, solidarity expresses not merely an enlarged conception of the common good. It also names 
a constitutional structure and a political culture in which citizens remain self-critical about the 
contours of that conception: its scope of enforcement, its normative meaning, and its grounds of 
legitimacy. Solidarity institutionalizes mutual critique as much as it does mutual support. This 
dynamic, reciprocal relation resists the passive ascription of nationality as a presumption that nat-
uralizes membership and belonging for some over others. It asks citizens to understand the ways they 
are always in the process of seeking exodus and refuge in their own political lives—again, in 
Agamben’s phrase, to understand “the refugees they are.” Particular interpretations or applications 
of solidaristic commitments in law—whether in the internal market, economic governance, or 
migration policy—are predicated upon this broader imagined sense of how solidarity works. 
This Article aims to illuminate this symbolic structure of solidarity and its concrete expression 
in EU law through a comparative analysis of contemporary constitutional theory and the evolving 
use of mutual recognition and mutual trust in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), 
particularly in the context of European asylum law and ongoing reforms to the Dublin Regulation. 
The limitations of solidarity in this area of law specifically—where the citizen encounters the ref-
ugee and also encounters the idea of the citizen-as-refugee—suggest critical limitations to the 
European Union’s project of post-national constitutionalism, more generally. They pose profound 
questions, I believe, for how Europeans might better imagine solidarity to function through law 
and legal institutions—and as a principle to guide public life. Such reforms become all the more 
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trenchant as the Treaty of Lisbon has given solidarity positive legal expression in Article 80 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
The Article is structured as follows: Section B elaborates the tensions of solidarity as a legal 
principle presently found in European law. To better conceive the relationship of solidarity to 
law, Section C turns to the most prominent expression of civic solidarity in contemporary 
European constitutional theory—the concept of “constitutional patriotism” articulated most com-
prehensively in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of law. In elaborating the terms of constitu-
tional patriotism, I trace how it finds clearest expression in the legal architecture of mutual 
recognition and the principle of mutual trust in EU asylum law. 
Section D then develops a critique of constitutional patriotism’s limitations and illustrates how 
it also applies to the principle of mutual trust—with analyses of how EU law fails at once to protect 
individual rights and the equality of Member States. These limitations frame ongoing litigation 
over whether the principle of mutual trust must underwrite the forced transfers of asylum-seekers 
under the Dublin Regulation—notwithstanding the practice’s incompatibility with emerging 
standards of rights protection as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. 
In light of this critique, Section E argues that solidarity as a legal principle is more compellingly 
conceived as a legal claim for mutual critique and responsiveness. Because responsiveness requires 
attention to the manifestations of particular harms, solidarity entails a form of judgment that cen-
ters the individual litigant and the particular case in an assessment of the adequacy of broader 
structural relations. This process is itself unpredictable and creative, driven by the exigencies 
of the case at hand. In the field of asylum law, I detail how the application of solidarity would 
offer a much-needed corrective to the structural imbalances of the Dublin Regulation. I conclude 
with reflections on the principle’s application in additional fields of EU law, as well. 
B. Solidarity as an Elusive Concept in EU Law 
Since Robert Schuman’s declaration that Europe shall be built through concrete achievements of 
“de facto solidarity,”7 solidarity has been a central, if tenuous, feature in the European Union’s 
legal discourse. While the original European treaties left the legal meaning of Schuman’s words 
inchoate, the present constitutional texts establish solidarity among the EU’s “classical princi-
ple[s]” of law, which play a “normative founding function for the whole of the Union’s legal 
order.”8 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lists solidarity as a value “common 
to Member States,” and Article 3 TEU specifies that the EU shall promote solidarity between 
generations, among Member States, and among peoples.9 Solidarity also reflects the principle 
of sincere cooperation found in Article 4(3) TEU which requires a collective commitment by both 
the European Union and Member States to fulfill their obligations “in full mutual respect” and 
correspondingly to prevent or restrain from conduct that might “jeopardize the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives.”10 These provisions are intended to strengthen EU states’ commitment 
outlined in the TEU’s Preamble “to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting 
their history, their culture and their traditions.”11 As Advocate General Bot has recently argued, 
solidarity reflects “the quintessence of what is both the raison d’etre and the objective of the 
7Robert Schuman, Minister Foreign & Eur. Aff., Declaration of 9 May 1950 (“L'Europe ne se fait pas d'un coup ni dans une 
construction d'ensemble, mais par des réalisations concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait.”). 
8Armin von Bogdandy, Founding Principles, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 53, 21 (A. von Bogdandy 
& J. Best eds., 2010). See also EJC, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi, para. 304 ECLI:EU:C:2008:11, Judgement of 
3 Sept. 2008 (understanding the EU Treaties ‘‘in no circumstances [to] permit any challenge to the principles that form part of 
the very foundations of the Community legal order.”). 
9Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 
13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
10Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1, art. 4(3). 
11Id. 
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European project” and in this sense forms an overarching “founding and existential value of 
the Union.”12 
Solidarity here aims to modulate and transform the national interest as refracted through 
responsibilities toward a European common good.13 Von Bogdandy emphasizes that this evolving 
design of the treaty’s solidarity provisions affirms the EU as more than an intergovernmental 
agreement among States yet still distinct from a federal polity.14 Nevertheless, the present and 
ongoing ways European law has asserted responsibilities of solidarity are difficult; their 
interactions are complex and often counterproductive in their attempt to redefine insular 
prerogatives of national sovereignty. Indeed, as it exerts specific pressures on the nature of 
national obligations, the meaning of solidarity remains controversial. 
Beyond its status as a broad structuring principle of EU constitutional law, theorists have 
attempted to clarify how dimensions of post-national solidarity result from the normative and 
practical requirements of European freedoms of movement and the EU’s multi-level system of gov-
ernance. Floris DeWitte, for example, has described the market, communitarian, and aspirational 
solidarities that oblige EU states to open certain kinds of social resources—such as unemployment 
insurance, welfare benefits, healthcare, primary and secondary education, et cetera—at various levels 
of governance to non-nationals depending on the nature and degree of their associational ties in the 
host state polity.15 The intent is as much to establish non-discriminatory criteria for access as to 
preserve the general stability and coherence of national redistributive systems. Similarly, Rainer 
Bauböck has disaggregated T.H. Marshall’s original trichotomy of citizenship16 by space, time, 
and structure befitting the correspondingly disaggregated sovereignties above and below the 
nation in today’s complex post-national regimes.17 Both theories rearrange solidaristic obligations 
by recasting relations of social belonging in terms of duration in time and proximity in space. 
While there is much to recommend about these visions of differentiated commitments, there 
remain salient gaps in this manner of resolving the issue of post-national solidarity. Neither 
Bauböck nor DeWitte sufficiently addresses how these disparate levels of solidarity are meant 
to relate to one another—not whether they are compatible at any point in time, but more impor-
tantly how they mutually affect one another over the course of time. In this regard, Alexander 
Somek is less sanguine. He has warned that such a model acts upon national solidarity, “altering 
its meaning.”18 Drawing on Tocqueville, Somek laments this distortion as an overriding ideologi-
cal pressure of “individualism”: “the political worldview of neoliberalism” that reduces questions 
of public provision to financial viability, efficiency, and flexibility.19 “Intriguingly,” Somek writes, 
12Opinion of Advocate General Bot, ECJ, Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council, 
ECLI:EU:C2017:618, paras. 17–18. 
13See, e.g., Case 39/72 Commission v. Italy, ECLI EU:C:1973;13 (Sept. 6, 2017), paras. 20–25, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
liste.jsf?num=C-39/72; Case 128/78 Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI EU:C:1979:32 (Feb. 7, 1979) para. 12, https:// 
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en,T,F&num=128/78. 
14Bogdandy, supra note 8, at 53. 
15Floris DeWitte, Justice in the EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity, 9  EUR. J. L.  STUD. 241 (2015). 
16See T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS, 71–134 (1964). 
17Rainer Bauböck, Citizenship and Collective Identities as Political Sources of Solidarity in the European Union, in THE 
STRAINS OF COMMITMENT: THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF SOLIDARITY IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 80 (K. Banting & W. Kylicka 
eds., 2017). 
18Alexander Somek, Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European Citizenship, 32 EUR. L.  REV. 787, 814 (2007). 
19Id. at 814. Here, Somek points, for example, to the underlying individualistic, competitive ideological shift of Commission 
v. Austria, where the European Court of Justice “effectively forced upon Austria a ‘merit based’ system of admission” to its 
public universities, with the regressive effect being that lower-income and less mobile Austrian taxpayers now would support 
middle-class, non-national youth likely to leave Austria once they completed their studies. “It is difficult to make out,” Somek 
concludes, “how in these instances catering to the desires of the mobile class helps to create an ever closer union among the 
peoples or Europe.” Id. at 818. Similar arguments can be made with respect to other categories of socio-economic rights, most 
prominently health care. See also, Case C-120/95, Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de maladie des employes prives, 1988 ECR I-1831; 
Christopher Newdick, Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity 43 COMMON MKT. L.  REV. 1645, 1663 (2006). 
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“with the prevalence of individualism, national solidarity begins to appear both ugly and unkind,” 
no longer a marker of social commitment or public right but of potential private gain.20 
Somek’s caution about the underlying neoliberal individualism in these arrangements of post-
national solidarity seems all too astute in light of prominent failures of solidaristic action in 
Europe’s contemporary crises. Two examples—each, in a sense, with its epicenter in Greece— 
are symptomatic. Consider how the proposal by the European Commission to reform the 
Dublin Regulation concerning responsibilities to lawfully examine asylum claims serves, in fact, 
merely to retrench the system’s fundamental inequality toward peripheral EU states and to 
penalize asylum seekers in the interests of preventing their secondary movement.21 And similarly 
consider—at the height of the Eurozone crisis—the legalistic invocation by Member States of the 
“no bailout” clause in Article 125 TFEU as grounds to refuse the needed restructuring of Greek 
sovereign debt and thus to affirm the morality play of “‘lazy Greeks” failing to repay hard-working 
“northerners.”22 This forgets, of course, not only the structural factors driving the crisis, including 
the risk eagerly assumed by the northern banking sector financing southern loans,23 but much 
more importantly the significant leniency historically afforded under EMU budgetary rules to 
24larger, more powerful states at Europe’s core. 
These shortcomings suggest the degree to which the use of solidarity in EU law remains in 
essential ways subordinate to existing, predominant interests—whether national or supranational 
and systemic—and its rarity and weakness in defending a transformative conception of the common 
good.25 Indeed, the Court of Justice of the EU, after earlier case law that pressed the boundaries of 
national solidarity’s scope in precisely the ways Somek found questionable, has been chronically unwill-
ing to develop a general understanding of solidarity as a discrete ground for European obligations. 
Following national backlash against the Court’s overly ambitious expansion of transnational 
social solidarity rights in the field of European citizenship law, the CJEU settled on a moderate 
position that accepted significant national restrictions to the provision of social assistance to those 
EU citizens who were economically inactive.26 Furthermore, in a number of recent cases concern-
ing responses to the Eurozone crisis, the Court has declined to interpret the meaning or scope of 
solidarity as a legal principle. In Pringle, for example, the Court neglected to consider solidarity as 
a rationale to justify its narrow reading of the no-bailout clause—as Advocate General Kokott had 
urged—and instead upheld the legality of the European Stability Mechanism on the basis of its 
20Somek, supra 18, at 816 
21See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council: Establishing the 
Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International 
Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (recast), 2016/0133 
(COD) 2016. See generally Eleni Karageorgiou, The Law and Practice of Solidarity in the Common European Asylum 
System: Article 80 TFEU and its Added Value, 14 EUR. POL’Y ANALYSIS 9 (2016). 
22See, e.g., Paul De Grauwe, The Eurozone as a Morality Play, 5  INTERECONOMICS 230 (2015). 
23See Wolfgang Streeck, Markets and Peoples: Democratic Capitalism and European Integration, 73 NEW LEFT REV. 63  
(2012). 
24See WOLFGANT STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 106 (P. Camiller trans., 2014). 
25See Esin Küçük, Solidarity in EU Law: An Elusive Political Statement or a Legal Principle with Substance?, 23 MAASTRICHT 
J. OF EUR. AND COMPAR. L. 965, 968 (2016) (arguing that “it is generally possible to speak of strict solidarity obligations only 
when they are driven by self-interest.”). See also Andrea Sangiovanni, Solidarity in the European Union: Problems and 
Prospects, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU LAW (J. Dickson & P. Eleftheriadis eds., 2012). 
26See ECJ, Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para. 44 (Sept. 20, 2001), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?docid=46599&doclang=en; ECJ, Case C-209/03, Bidar, ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, paras. 56–57 (Mar. 
15, 2005), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-209/03; ECJ, Case C-158/07, Förster, ECLI:EU:C:2008:630, para. 
52 (Nov. 18, 2008), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-158/07; ECJ, Case C-138/02, Collins, ECLI:EU: 
C:2004:172, para. 67 (Mar. 23, 2004), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-138/02. See generally Catherine 
Barnard, EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity, in SOCIAL WELFARE AND EU LAW 161–65 (E. Spaventa & M. 
Dougan eds., 2005). See also Daniel Thym, The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for 
Economically Inactive Union Citizens, 52 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17 (2015). 
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role in promoting sound budgetary policy among Member States.27 Similarly, the Court preferred 
a highly technical line of reasoning to assess compatibility of the ECB’s Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) Programme with Article 123 TFEU without invoking solidarity as a guiding 
principle.28 And in the field of asylum law, even since the codification of solidarity in Article 80 
TFEU in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Court has chosen to avoid relying on the principle in disposing 
of cases concerning the equity of the Dublin Regulation. In Halaf, for example, the Court side-
stepped the explicit question whether the Dublin II Regulation’s “sovereignty clause” in Article 
3(2) should be interpreted in light of Article 80 TFEU and resolved the case without mention 
of solidarity.29 Even where the Court has accepted that the Dublin Regulation must be read 
“in the light of” Article 80 TFEU—as it stated in the recent case affirming the binding nature 
of the emergency relocation scheme unveiled in 2015—its legal reasoning has left the content 
and scope of solidarity as a principle undefined.30 And in NS and ME, a case I will discuss in 
greater detail below, the Court accepted limits on the mandatory transfers of asylum-seekers 
under the Dublin Regulation while referencing solidarity merely in passing.31 
Some of the troubles here arise, no doubt, from difficult conceptual tensions among 
Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment views on the relevant terms and bounds of 
solidarity.32 But salient to the question of legal solidarity is another dimension of these crises: 
The disciplinary, often punitive use of legality itself. These responses disappoint, in part, because 
they employ the law foremost as a system of social management, absent positive reflection on the 
common good and judgments about what it might demand. Legal intervention is here conceived 
as reactive and constraining: a means to compensate for systemic deficiency, but without accom-
panying normative resources to critically examine the background presumptions on which 
present sovereign interests rest. As with Somek’s individualism, European law’s underlying metric 
of judgment for solidarity remains tied not to a polity’s normative commitments and sensitivity to 
the needs around them, but to an individual’s capacity to choose and to the legal system’s capacity 
to efficiently manage that choice. This signals an ideological elision of historical, structural per-
spectives,33 and an overbearing tendency to consider law from the mindset of what Judith Shklar 
famously critiqued as “legalism”: the “ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of 
rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”34 In 
this way, European law remains caught in the functionalist teleology of systems integration, even 
as its inadequacy to the deeper demands of solidarity is laid bare. 
Somek’s critique does not itself offer a response to this problem. Nevertheless, it does encourage 
a more dynamic and diachronic attentiveness to how public perception of solidarity may be 
altered—and degraded—by certain attempts to realize post-national legal principles. He draws 
attention to how such realizations might in fact threaten to unravel the very notion of law as 
27ECJ, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland and Others ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras. 142–44 (Nov. 27, 
2012), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-370/12. 
28ECJ, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al v. Duetscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400 (June 16, 2015), https://curia.europa.eu/ 
juris/liste.jsf?num=C-62/14. 
29ECJ, Case C-528/11 Zuheyr Frayeh Halaf, ECLI:EU:C:2013:342, para. 25 (May 30, 2013), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
liste.jsf?num=C-528/11&language=EN. 
30See ECJ, Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631, para. 253, 
Judgement of 6 September 2017. 
31ECJ, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, paras. 87, 
Judgement of December 2011. 
32See generally Hauke Brunkhorst, The Transformation of Solidarity and the Enduring Impact on Monotheism: Five 
Remarks, 35 PHIL. &  SOC. CRITICISM 93, 95 (2009). 
33See, e.g., Peter Verovsek, The Immanent Potential of Economic and Monetary Integration: A Critical Reading of the 
Eurozone Crisis, 15 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 401 (2017) (“The political determination to keep the euro—summed up in 
Angela Merkel’s statement that ‘If the euro fails, Europe fails’—has not been matched by a readiness to accept the structural 
imperatives of a functioning currency area.”). 
34JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: AN ESSAY ON LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICS 1 (1964). 
German Law Journal 513 
a source, not just of coordinated action, but of normative social integration. Somek’s work is there-
fore a call to consider more carefully how post-national law might yet avoid this compromising 
entanglement with neoliberal individualism and a too shallow conception of systems-thinking. 
If, as Hauke Brunkhorst writes, “[s]olidarity dialectically combines opposites, contradictions, and 
differences” and therefore might serve as a “bridge between the different modes of social and sys-
temic integration of society,”35 this dialectic remains an unfinished project in European Union law. 
It poses again the question, tabled by Havel and Agamben above, of how we might differently 
conceive solidarity’s place as a meaningful structuring principle of constitutional law, which would 
accordingly guide public interpretations of state competencies, shared obligations, determinations of 
jurisdiction and standing, and the scope of legal rights. How might solidarity intertwine social inte-
gration with social transformation anew in order to “modulate” the nature of state action and the 
kinds of considerations it reflects? If Article 2 TEU does indeed constitute a new “constitutional para-
digm” with solidarity as a central principle to “transform existing legal relationships” and to “shap[e] 
and direct[] other core values and legal institutions,”36 what are its features and how might it do so? 
The enduringly elusive nature of solidarity—even in times of crisis—reflects a need to scru-
tinize and perhaps revaluate the imagined theoretical grounds of legal solidarity at once in 
European Union law and in European constitutional theory. Therefore, I aim to use theory to 
make sense of legal developments and, in turn, to use legal developments to make sense of theo-
retical claims—and hopefully to offer new ways to think about each. I turn my analysis to mutual 
trust, in particular, because it perhaps reflects most directly the structural ambition to see legal ties 
as the basis for solidarity, and because it, too, reflects the lasting, path-dependent legacies of 
European market integration. 
Mutual trust transposes concepts and symbolic understandings from the EU’s internal market-
oriented policies to its ambition to create a space of other kinds of freedom and security, as well, 
and—perhaps most of all—to its relations with those who come to claim protection at its borders. 
Whether this transposition is successful and what it reveals about the ongoing struggles for solid-
arity through law are the subjects of the remaining sections. 
C. Mutual Trust Through the Lens of Constitutional Patriotism: Solidarity and its 
Preconditions 
As Brunkhorst has elaborated in his treatment of the idea, civic solidarity demands (a) a fully politi-
cized conception of the people again “in purely legal terms as the totality of those subject to law”;37 
(b) a clear connection to the universalizing logic of human rights;38 and (c) an emphasis on the 
inclusion of these affected legal subjects in the process of legislation, that is, in a human right to 
democracy with a “strict identity of the ruling and the ruled.”39 This perspective provides an account 
of legal order as the medium in which solidarity is to take shape, even absent a post-national demos 
with thicker social ties to underwrite citizens’ participation. Here, a global legal community (globale 
Rechtsgenossenschaft) creates a legal ethos and commitments to the effective protection of rights as 
conditions in which reciprocal responsibilities can be formulated and realized. 
Here, Brunkhorst is indebted to a Habermasian discourse theory of law and, specifically, to 
Habermas’s understanding of “constitutional patriotism” as a way to ground national identity 
in universalistic civic ties through the binding nature of the rule of law. Insofar as solidarity is 
35HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY 5 (2005). 
36Malcolm Ross, Solidarity—A New Constitutional Paradigm for the EU?, in PROMOTING SOLIDARITY IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 23, 36 (M. Ross & Y. Borgmann-Prebil, eds., 2010). 
37Brunkhorst, supra note 35, at 71. 
38Id. at 64–65. 
39Id. at 73. 
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mediated by attachment to constitutional principle, it always potentially extends to new citizens, 
territories, and forms of recognition. 
The development of constitutional patriotism spans Habermas’s early writings on post-war 
German political identity to his contemporary efforts to ground a European political culture beyond 
the nation-state.40 Habermas recognizes that a legal system of rights protection “must be enduringly 
linked with the motivations and convictions of the citizens, for without such a motivational anchor-
ing they could not become the driving force behind the dynamically conceived project of producing 
an association of [free and equal] individuals.”41 Yet, Habermas has also made it clear that any 
theories that derive such anchoring from the “ambivalent bonding force of archaic institutions” 
are wedded to the now utterly discredited “metasocial guarantees of the sacred.”42 Therefore, it 
is constitutional patriotism—as the form of motivational affect directed towards constitutional 
principles themselves—that serves to supersede the particularist tendencies of pre-political 
ethnic-nationalist recognition, attaching instead—ultimately—to universalist rights and norms 
embedded in constitutional law.43 Constitutional patriotism hopes to offer a procedural basis for 
social cohesion and identity-formation within a post-metaphysical, pluralistic polity. 
On this reading, solidarity is one of “the results or the ‘product’ of constitutional patriotism”: in  
Habermas’s definition, “an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers.”44 Solidarity is 
tied to the success and vitality of reasoning among citizens in the public sphere, secured by the 
co-original implication of private and public autonomy, by both liberal and republican participa-
tory rights.45 Over time, this relationship of mutual and reciprocal participation assumes among 
citizens the structure of a shared constitutional project that exceeds the boundaries of national 
states and parochial political communities. 
The premise is that constitutional patriotism can link together national communities without 
requiring or presuming an already formed and fully consolidated transnational demos, one that 
would make the ongoing work and negotiation of the terms of solidarity superfluous. Post-
national solidarity refers to a kind of process that sits precisely at the point of this negotiation. 
So, too, with the EU’s principle of mutual trust. 
In European law, the principle of mutual trust has been a foundation for the expansion of 
European community from the early judgments protecting the nascent common market. In 
the well-known judgment in Cassis de Dijon, the European Court of Justice obliged Member 
States to “trust” the legal practice of fellow states with regard to the lawful production and 
marketing of goods such that domestic protectionist measures would be unnecessary and thereby 
justifiably prohibited under the European treaties.46 “Mutual trust” in this sense was a reciprocal 
commitment of Member States to the “legality and quality of each other’s legal systems.”47 It was 
the corollary to the mutual recognition of what these systems produced—a mutual solidarity, 
however limited to economics its essential terms were. 
40See generally JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM (2007). 
41Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM 134 
(A. Guttman ed., 1994). 
42JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
27 (William Rehg trans., 1998). 
43See Jürgen Habermas, Political Culture in Germany Since 1968, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITICISM AND 
THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE (S. W. Nicholsen ed. & trans., 1989). 
44See MÜLLER, supra note 40, at 63; Jürgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, 11 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 16 (2001). 
45HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 104 (“The co-originality of private and public autonomy first reveals itself when we decipher, in 
discourse-theoretical terms, the motif of self-legislation according to which the addressees of law are simultaneously the authors of 
their rights. The substance of human rights then resides in the formal conditions for the legal institutionalization of those 
discursive processes of opinion- and will-formation in which the sovereignty of the people assumes a binding character.”). 
46Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 1979 ECR 649, para. 14. 
47Evelien Brouwer, Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of 
Proof, 9  UTRECHT L. REV. 135, 136 (2013). 
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While in the first decades such principles meant primarily to protect the free movement of 
goods and services, the principle of mutual trust soon became vital for the cooperation of 
European states in matters of criminal law and, ultimately most germane for our purposes, immi-
gration law, as well. Indeed, as the powers of the EU expanded in the “area of freedom, security, 
and justice” (AFSJ), mutual trust became a key mechanism for judicial cooperation reflected in the 
Tampere Conclusions of 1999 and later in the Stockholm Programme of 2009 concerning citizen-
ship, security, asylum, and immigration policy.48 
Mutual trust under the AFSJ, even more so than the mutual recognition of goods and services, 
creates a political and institutional space that approximates a post-national legal community, struc-
tured by the rule of law and the mutual affirmation of legal decisions taken elsewhere. While mutual 
recognition of goods and services enables cross-border flows and thus protects the rights of indi-
viduals in their private spheres, cooperation under the AFSJ entails giving mutual effect to judicial 
decisions. It affirms actions taken by representatives of a fellow Member State—whether decisions on 
claims to asylum or arrest warrants or other criminal sanctions—and thus by extension also affirms 
the opinions and decisions taken by that state’s citizens.49 The state “not only recognizes a law as 
being equivalent but recognizes the judicial act in its interpretation of all relevant provisions in a 
given case.”50 That decisions affecting individual liberty and fundamental rights can be enforced, 
and not merely that the “fruits” of other legal orders can be accepted, confirms the systemic legiti-
macy of those decisions in light of an implicitly shared set of procedural and substantive principles.51 
Citizens of the “trusting” state thus implicitly affirm the normative status of another’s decisions  as 
their own. And, conversely, the state that means to be “trusted” evokes solidarity under the expect-
ation that its own system of law can be affirmed by another as legitimate. 
Mutual trust in this sense expresses the form of commitment we find in Habermasian constitutional 
patriotism. One’s allegiance across borders tracks the sound legal principles of fellow Member States. 
While different legal systems might indeed realize such principles in distinct ways, the affirmation of 
common, universalizing principles is enough to engender a binding and reciprocal relationship. 
Like constitutional patriotism, mutual trust entails a necessary presupposition—a commitment 
to trust another’s interpretation of principle as legitimate and enforceable without mandating that 
one explicitly share in that particular interpretation. Here, normativity is affirmed formally with-
out being recreated substantively in the individual case. Trust is secured in the first instance by 
reference to a shared legality alone. It is thereby a principle of agreement and forbearance at once. 
For this reason, Kalypso Nicolaidis describes mutual trust as a “horizontal transfer of sovereignty,” 
striking a negotiated balance that, on the one hand, “respect[s] sovereignty” by not requiring the 
complete harmonization of law and the centralization of authority and, on the other, “radically 
reconfigure[s] it” by “delinking the exercise of sovereign power from its territorial anchor.”52 
Here, solidarity is a product of the relationship established by this transfer of sovereignty. But 
this solidarity rests on an unsteady ground. For there exists a well-known tension between the 
principle of a presumed mutual trust and the underlying prerequisite for that trust that comes 
from a certain level of explicit harmonization in the practices of Member States.53 Can there 
be trust, in other words, without harmonization? The shared commitment in mutual trust is 
48See European Council, The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 2010 O.J. 
(C115) 1. 
49See Sandra Lavenex, Mutual Recognition and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy, 14 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 762, 765–66 (2007). 
50Id. at 765. 
51Id.; see also Miguel Maduro, So Close and yet so far: The Paradoxes of Mutual Recognition, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 814, 823 
(2007). 
52Kalypso Nicolaidis, Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe Through Mutual Recognition, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 682, 685 
(2007). 
53Id. at 686–88. See generally Kalypso Nicolaidis, Mutual Recognition Among Nations: The European Community and Trade 
in Services, (1993) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University). 
516 Paul Linden-Retek 
predicated precisely on forgoing development of the same rules and standards across jurisdictions, 
thereby allowing national political and legal cultures a degree of freedom. As long as such national 
instantiations sufficiently reflect the same systemic principles, the broader integrity of the legal 
system is trusted. But the cooperative execution of another’s laws nevertheless suggests the need 
for some minimum level of harmonization and some form of agreement reflected in the particular 
practices of states. Mutual trust seems to require some underlying institutional “management” of 
its terms that exceeds the simple conformity found in formal principles of recognition.54 
The solidarity implied and created by mutual trust in this regard represents a post-national 
legal principle—not a formal arrangement but a dynamic of interaction, a mode of governance 
that requires judgment about its own scope and limits.55 If solidarity here means a commitment to 
protect the agency of others, can we do so for those with whom we disagree, whose agency might 
undermine our own and might therefore undermine the efficacy of our principles as we have 
conceived them? Remember that constitutional patriotism aims precisely to supersede the particu-
larist tendencies of pre-political recognition, attaching instead to the universalist norms of 
constitutional law. Thus the question here is not merely how to prevent mutual trust from vio-
lating one’s own principles but something deeper: On what ground are we to say such a violation is 
in fact illegitimate? With reference to whom, sensitive to whose concerns, and in what measure? 
In posing the question this way, the principle of solidarity aims to make this tension in mutual 
trust productive. Assessments of mutual trust might in some instances create pressures toward 
explicit harmonization of laws but more broadly might, in the long-term, promote “judicial com-
munication, mutual learning, and ultimately also approximation and trust.”56 Solidarity here 
acquires a dynamic insofar as it depends on the adjudication and enforcement of each particular 
case—with the understanding that each case attests to the broader systemic legitimacy of another’s 
rule of law and, in turn, bears in some way on the interpretation of one’s own legal commitments 
in the home jurisdiction. Each case occasions self-introspection, self-criticism, an understanding 
of another’s interests and how they might fit into one’s own, their impact in particular cases, and 
whether and why these abide by one’s principles. Over time, in other words, this process comes 
closer to forming a basis for a post-national constitutional project that might creatively expand the 
normative self-understandings of a common political community. 
Constitutional patriotism imagines precisely this kind of “transformative conception of living 
together.”57 It shifts the understanding of political identity from an “unreflective” identification 
with particular national traditions to “dynamic and complex processes of identity-formation.”58 
Constitutional patriotism is a “collective learning process,” in which “citizens see their constitu-
tional culture as always open and incomplete.”59 Citizens attend, in other words, to the “refugees 
they are”—renegotiating the bounds and meanings of the political communities in which they 
seek to belong ever more fully. 
Implicit, but central to the preservation of post-national solidarity under constitutional 
patriotism, is the idea that there is a “life of the law.” Habermas, in elegant and powerful prose, 
embraces this spirit: 
[T]he constitutional state does not represent a finished structure but a delicate and sensitive 
—above all fallible and revisable—enterprise, whose purpose it to realize rights anew in 
changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights better, to institutionalize 
it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically.60 
54Nicolaidis, supra note 52, at 686–88. 
55See id. at 686. 
56Lavenex, supra note 49, at 776. 
57MÜLLER, supra note 40, at 71. 
58Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
59Id. at 61. 
60HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 384. 
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Similarly, Nicolaidis writes that the way mutual trust is managed means it must also create “critical 
safeguards” that make it “progressive and flexible over time.”61 This is perhaps the crucial hope of 
constitutional patriotism in the post-national context. If constitutional law can indeed be considered 
open in this fundamental sense, then competing polities might meaningfully intertwine their con-
stitutional claims so as to support the kind of cross-border solidaristic commitments needed today. 
Nevertheless, much hinges on how such processes of open-ended identity formation go for-
ward, and more must be said about how democratic institutions and constitutional law might 
reflect them. And given the inadequacies of solidarity we find in Europe’s contemporary crisis, 
there is a misgiving that such normative hopes remain in crucial respects compromised by internal 
contradictions buried beneath their surface. The question remains whether the specific terms of 
Habermas’s hope for a “dynamic constitutionalism”62 —as we see them reflected when the prin-
ciple of mutual trust is put into practice—succeed in fully preserving this life of the law beyond the 
nation-state; and whether constitutional patriotism can indeed underwrite the kinds of political 
orientations, relationships, and subjectivities imagined by post-national solidarity. 
D. The Dilemmas of Solidarity: The Dublin Regulation, Formal Recognition, and the 
Necessity of Critique 
A key tension that structures both constitutional patriotism and mutual trust is this relation 
between universal norms in constitutional law and the particular ways they are interpreted, con-
textualized, and embedded in constitutional practice. The tension arises because it remains clear— 
either in the ambitions of mutual trust or in Habermas’s theory—whether the real attachment 
capable of sustaining trust is to the principles or to particular character of the social worlds that 
give principles their specific meanings. The nature and post-national possibilities of solidarity— 
precisely as the product of this attachment—thus very much depend on the objects of attachment 
we have in mind. Habermas writes in an important, but ambiguous passage that “[s]olidar-
ity . . . arises out of law only indirectly, of course: by stabilizing behavioral expectations, law simul-
taneously secures symmetrical relationships of reciprocal recognition between abstract bearers of 
individual rights.”63 Such stabilization involves not merely abstract rights as elements of a dem-
ocratic procedural consensus but also an understanding of the meaning of these rights as citizens 
live and invoke them in political practice. It thereby remains somehow related, if not entirely 
wedded, to certain communitarian dimensions of political life. 
Indeed, after early criticism that he offered resources for too thin a political bond, Habermas 
modulated the relationship he envisioned constitutional patriotism could establish between uni-
versal principles of communicative rationality and a particular political-cultural tradition. No 
longer presuming a direct attachment to universal principles simpliciter, constitutional patriotism 
in this new light signified a more particularized and historicized attachment—to “the political 
order and the principles of the [German] Basic Law.”64 While Habermas never completely left 
behind his previous abstract formulations, his subsequent work immediately situated references 
to constitutional patriotism “within the historical context of a legal community”65 or simply 
within a “shared political culture.”66 The principles in positive law must be given, Habermas 
admits, a definite shape. He notes that “[t]he identity of a person, of a group, of a nation, or 
61Nicolaidis, supra note 52, at 695. 
62HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 384. 
63Id. at 448–89 (emphasis added). 
64HABERMAS, supra note 43, at 257. 
65HABERMAS, supra note 41, at 225. 
66Jürgen Habermas, The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, in THE INCLUSION 
OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 118 (C. Cronin & P. de Greiff eds., 1998). 
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of a region is always something concrete, something particular.”67 It cannot “consist merely in 
general moral orientations and characteristics, which are shared by all alike,” but must instead 
present an “image” to oneself and others.68 To suture commitment to legal procedures, 
Habermas invokes a specified image of a people that is—at least for a time—unified, bounded, 
and fixed.69 The object of attachment, the means by which citizens feel bound and committed to 
the law and to one another, is this stabilization of expectations in light of a political culture of law 
that is historically and culturally specific. 
Now, just as with the notion of mutual trust, if constitutional patriotism is to remain a source of 
solidarity that does not foreclose the universalizing character of law, this relationship to political 
culture must have rather distinct characteristics. While Habermas rules out the particularity of an 
ethnic or linguistic-cultural grounding for political commitment, a different sort of particularism 
does indeed underwrite the embrace of constitutional principles. The nature of the “shared politi-
cal culture” must nevertheless be, as Habermas writes, dissociated from a “hegemonic majority 
culture” and “uncoupled from the level of subcultures and their prepolitical identities,” such that 
“different cultural, ethnic, and religious forms of life [can] interact on equal terms within the 
same political community.”70 This is what Habermas has in mind when he reiterates that, in 
post-conventional societies, “republicanism must learn to stand on its own feet.”71 Thus, while 
solidarity grounds itself in particular allegiances to different constitutions with different 
interpretations of the catalogue of rights, such allegiance still engenders a consciousness of the 
universal. In the post-national context of mutual trust, “the same legal principles would . . . have 
to be interpreted from the perspectives of different national traditions and histories”72 and 
brought into focus as part of a now transnational legal culture. 
These formulations render unclear, however, what a “shared political culture” is meant to 
include. Specifically, what role is political culture meant to play in mediating law’s rational 
discourse, on the one hand, and the broader cultural meanings of the lifeworld, on the other? 
Consider, for example, what Habermas has written specifically about the future of a European 
public sphere and a supranational political culture: 
[To date] by and large, the national public spheres are culturally isolated from one another. 
They are anchored in contexts in which political issues gain relevance only against the back-
ground of national histories and national experiences. In the future, however, differentiation 
could occur in a European culture between a common political culture and the branching 
national traditions of art and literature, historiography, philosophy, and so forth.73 
This construction is curious for a number of reasons. First, Habermas accepts an analytic bifur-
cation of politics and culture, and ostensibly of constitutional principles and their broader social 
imaginaries. If this is so, it is unclear how citizens are understood to live out the common political 
culture and perceive it as something normatively valid or socially meaningful. This risks, again, 
conceiving of political commitment too “thinly.” Second, if we accept some kind of interrelation-
ship between the thematization of political issues and their exploration in the broader cultural 
lifeworld, then the difference between the two scenarios Habermas identifies seems, in fact, to 
67Jürgen Habermas, The Limits of Neo-Historicism, in AUTONOMY AND SOLIDARITY: INTERVIEWS WITH JÜRGEN HABERMAS 
239 (P. Dews ed., 1996). 
68Id. 
69See also Alessandro Ferrara, Of Boats and Principles: Reflections on Habermas’s “Constitutional Democracy” 29 POL. 
THEORY 782 (2001) (asking what exactly Habermas understands to be the objects of political attachment under constitutional 
patriotism). 
70Habermas, supra note 66, at 117–18. 
71Id. at 117. 
72HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 500. 
73Id. at 507. 
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be quite minimal. As long as national cultural traditions remain “branched” in this way, then it 
seems likely that the vocabularies and languages used in the public sphere will be “culturally iso-
lated” in the same manner, thus reducing the second scenario to the first. 
These points are highly abstract, but return for a moment to the context of mutual trust. If a 
“shared political culture” must mean that the terms of mutual trust reflect an underlying consen-
sus that such terms sufficiently accommodate the particular interpretations of law that are to be 
mutually affirmed, how can we distinguish this from an explicitly agreed convergence of mutually 
applicable standards? If mutual trust in fact becomes the latter, is the relationship still one of 
solidarity? Or does it instead become one of rule-following in a manner that opens or “modulates” 
national sovereignty much less creatively or transformatively from the perspective of post-
nationality? Is it still the site of the kind of mutual learning post-national solidarity meant to engage 
as a balance of agreement and forbearance? And, conversely, if a “shared political culture” means that 
mutual trust does indeed remain highly formal and thin, then in what sense can mutual trust entail a 
solidarity that triggers critical inquiry into particular national practices—practices which can always 
mask power differentials that exclude without justification? Does it in this latter case simply become 
what Nicolaidis criticizes as mere isolated, “blind” trust?74 And if “shared political culture” of mutual 
trust reduces to either of these two scenarios, can it still sustain the kind of emancipatory mutual 
learning and “dynamic constitutionalism” as imagined? 
There are thus two currents circulating beneath Habermas’s post-national constitutional 
project, and they flow against one another. Habermas certainly wishes for a kind of political 
culture that nests the particular historical experiences of nations in a certain manner within the uni-
versality of democratic principles. But in the examples and elaborations Habermas has offered, the 
idea of a “shared political culture” masks key contradictions as a substrate of post-national attach-
ment. While Habermas is careful to avoid making a national political culture too particular— 
embedded too firmly in cultural social groupings—he perceives the particularisms of national con-
stitutions and their historical interpretations of rights “more benignly,” as Robert Post and Reva 
Siegel put it.75 While the former threaten universal democratic principles and thereby require uncou-
pling, the latter comfortably give them concrete meaning without compromising their emancipatory 
orientation “one iota.”76 This seems to be the ambit, too, of constitutionalizing mutual trust in EU 
law. But—as we shall see with the example of the Dublin Regulation—the fear that such tension does 
in fact compromise the emancipatory orientation is significant, indeed. 
I. Trusting Fundamental Protections: Dublin and Mutual Recognition 
Recall that the Dublin Regulation allocates responsibility among Member States for the processing 
of requests to asylum according to several criteria: Alongside family unity, state issuing a legal 
residence or visa, and place of application, the most salient criterion in times when there is a mass 
movement of refugees is the first country of irregular entry. These criteria are significant, more-
over, as the Dublin system permits the transfer of asylum seekers to another Member State if this 
state is found in fact to be responsible. Allocation criteria and the capacity to transfer support 
Dublin’s two main purposes—as affirmed in its 2013 recast (Dublin III): (1) to ensure protection 
to those seeking asylum, and (2) to deter “forum shopping” and multiple applications and thereby 
improve the efficiency of processing and reduce costs to Member States.77 When Member States 
made such transfers in the past, they relied on the principle of mutual trust and presumed 
adequate fundamental rights protections for asylum seekers in the receiving state. Recent 
74Nicolaidis, supra note 52, at 685–86. 
75ROBERT POST & REVA SIEGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 12 (draft on file with 
author). 
76Habermas, supra note 66, at 500. 
77See Council Regulation No. 604/2013, Recitals 4-5, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31. 
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European case law has interrupted this process, ruling that mutual trust may be presumed but 
must be rebuttable, and thus more sensitive to the factual respect of fundamental rights in receiv-
ing jurisdictions. The ways such rulings navigate the tensions of mutual trust are instructive for 
our understanding of post-national solidarity. 
In the context of the Dublin Regulation, the principle of mutual trust refers to the assessment 
that all EU Member States are safe countries for the reception of claims to asylum. This deter-
mination is expressed in the Regulation itself, referencing Member State participation in the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the “Common European Asylum 
System.” It has since been further codified in successive European directives on rules of reception 
and asylum procedures, and is further reflected in the accession of all EU states to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the non-refoulement principle interpreted in its Article 3.78 
Prior to the latest round of litigation and its recent Recast, the Dublin II system imposed no 
obligation on Member States where applications are lodged to refrain from transfer according to 
Dublin criteria and assume responsibility themselves.79 Solidarity among Member States pre-
sumed the adequacy of one another’s legal norms. In order to constrain duplicate applications, 
Member States committed to affirming one another’s asylum decisions: “[R]ejected in one 
country, rejected everywhere.”80 
But this accession to shared constitutional principles has in practice belied serious deficiencies 
in European asylum procedures. It has obscured enduring and profound differences in the 
national interpretation and implementation of the above human rights agreements—with 
essential disparities in procedural guarantees, reception conditions, and integration capacities 
of Member States. And this presumption of trust based upon adequate formal standards has 
consistently been dispelled by critical reports of systemic failures in the asylum systems of 
European states at the geographic periphery of the European Union.81 
Mutual trust here becomes a veneer beneath which rights protections can be hidden and 
tolerated—and thus certain solidarity among Member States becomes a means to deny solidarity 
to those who seek asylum in Europe. Yet further still, at the same time, formal solidarity of 
cooperation under mutual trust sanctions blindness to structural imbalances and unfairness in 
the allocation of responsibility among States. The “first country of irregular entry” rule, in 
particular, shifts responsibility rather than seeking to equitably share it. 
The flawed relation of mutual trust to solidarity reveals an intrinsic instability and a gap in the 
Habermasian reliance on a shared legal culture as an adequate ground for post-national solida-
ristic relations. It again pays too little attention to how differences in implementation at the 
national level in fact reveal the imbalance of the presumed underlying consensus on the limits 
of recognition. 
Habermas in his constitutional theory has responded to this gap by emphasizing the dynamic 
structure of agreement in legal procedures. Specifically, he appeals to the “all affected interests” 
78Id.at Recitals 2-42. See also Council Directive 2003/9/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18; Council Directive 2005/85/EC, 2005 O.J. 
(L 326) 13; Council Directive 2004/83/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12. 
79Council Regulation 343/2003, art. 20 (1), 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1. 
80Nicolaidis, supra note 52, at 687. 
81See, e.g., European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Public Statement Concerning Greece, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.refworld.org/type,SPEECH, 
COECPT,,4ee21a2a2,0.html; Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE (Apr. 16, 2009), https://rm.coe.int/16806db88f; EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Coping 
With a Fundamental Rights Emergency: The Situation of Persons Crossing the Greek Land Border in an Irregular Manner 
(Mar. 8, 2011), https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2011/coping-fundamental-rights-emergency-situation-persons-crossing-
greek-land-border; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and 
Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers (Sept. 21, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/09/ 
21/pushed-back-pushed-around/italys-forced-return-boat-migrants-and-asylum-seekers; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Greece–The 
EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece (Sept. 21, 2011), https://www.hrw. 
org/report/2011/09/21/eus-dirty-hands/frontex-involvement-ill-treatment-migrant-detainees-greece. 
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democratic principle of legitimacy—the foundational dictum that a polity must “not exclude any-
one who is affected by the possible coercive measures of the legal community from the community 
of equal citizens.”82 The democratic principle thereby combines a compositional standard of 
inclusion with a basic procedural mechanism for guiding political participation. It is at once a 
counter-factual ideal for assessing the legitimacy of laws and political decisions but also a delib-
erative model for how public institutions ought to function.83 The question is whether this pro-
cedural view is an adequate way to conceive post-national solidaristic legality and politics. 
In their response to the inadequacies of the Dublin system, European courts have relied pre-
cisely on this approach, scrutinizing mutual trust as in fact a hindrance to the effective protection 
of human rights. In the landmark 2011 case MSS v. Belgium and Greece, the European Court of 
Human Rights denied the presumption of trust as pertaining to the satisfactory treatment of asy-
lum seekers in Greece. It thereby ruled that Belgium’s transfer of an Afghan asylum seeker to 
Greece under the Dublin Regulation violated the European Convention’s protections against 
inhumane and degrading treatment.84 The Court concluded that merely “the existence of domestic 
laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in prin-
ciple are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection.”85 
The European Court of Justice that same year similarly affirmed that a Member State’s discretion 
to refuse a transfer under the Dublin system in fact becomes an obligation in cases where rights of the 
applicant under Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are in question and when “they 
cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure” in the receiving state.86 Like 
the ECtHR, the CJEU emphasized that “the presumption  underlying  the Dublin mechanism, . . . that  
asylum seekers will be treated in a way which complies with fundamental rights, must be regarded as 
rebuttable,” specifically notwithstanding the fact that the “Common European Asylum System is 
based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and the guarantee that nobody 
will be sent back to a place where they again risk being persecuted.”87 
There is of course more to these complex rulings. But important for our understanding of how 
responsibility is conceived is how they reject the view that mutual trust is merely a procedural 
matter of accession to the correct conventions with sound legal principles. In effect, the rulings 
require that Member States not defer to the veneer of a shared legal culture but instead scrutinize 
how adequately formal procedures are in fact realized by fellow States in practice.88 In MSS, the 
Belgian government argued that the asylum seeker had “failed to voice his fears” concerning a 
transfer to Greece.89 The Court rejected this argument. Rather, it emphasized that the applicant 
could not be “expected to bear the entire burden of proof” and that Belgium would itself need to 
“verify how the Greek authorities applied their legislation on asylum.”90 
Dispositive was the idea that the state must share responsibility for ensuring an applicant’s 
rights were in fact protected. Belgium could not escape its responsibilities behind a conclusive 
82See Brunkhorst, supra note 35, at 170. 
83See Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: 
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL (S. Benhabib ed., 1996). 
84MSS v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, para. 342 (Jan. 21, 2011), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid% 
22:[%22001-103050%22]} (“When they apply the Dublin Regulation . . . States must make sure that the intermediary country’s 
asylum procedure afford sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum seeker being removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of 
origin without any evaluation of the risks he faces from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention.”). 
85Id. at para. 353. 
86ECJ, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME and Others v. 
Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] ECR I-13905, paras. 98, 106. 
ECJ, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865 (Dec. 2011), 
paras. 98, 106. 
87Id. at paras. 75, 104. 
88See MSS v. Belgium and Greece, paras. 352, 358. 
89Id. at para. 346. 
90Id. at para. 358. 
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presumption; it was required to take responsibility for its own coercive measures—its own 
involvement in putting asylum seekers in harm’s way—as Habermas’s principle of democracy 
suggests. The dynamic account of solidarity here tracks this new assessment. 
II. Critical Problems and the Problem of Critique 
How are we, in the end, to read these cases? In one respect, they secured a higher level of rights 
protection for those seeking asylum in the procedures of the Dublin Regulation. Following the 
MSS ruling, most EU Member States suspended their transfers to Greece. Following the decision 
in NS/ME, that halt because near-universal, and the prohibition on transfers to states with “systemi-
cally deficient” asylum protections was incorporated into the Dublin Regulation’s recast, Dublin III. 
And, yet, in another respect, the responsibility for a state’s coercive measures—and thus solidarity 
with the asylum seeker and fellow Member State alike—remained essentially vague. While Dublin III 
reflected the CJEU’s language, it failed to provide further administrative or legal guidance on the 
meaning of “systemic deficiencies” that require a prohibition of transfer. Substantially divergent 
interpretations among Member States of what “systemic deficiencies” entails have meant that states 
have hesitated to apply the prohibition to other cases that nevertheless bear similarity to Greece— 
including inadequate processing and reception capacity in Italy or Bulgaria.91 In effect, the dilemma 
for solidarity of a presumed shared political commitment here resurfaces. Dublin’s recast erected a 
new conclusive legal presumption—a new shared legal culture, in Habermas’s terms—that served to 
forestall critique of state practice and to entrench state prerogatives anew. 
Is it enough, therefore, merely to track coercion—and to include those affected by that coercion 
in determinations of responsibility? What if the invocation of coercion depends, in fact, on a prior 
understanding of what coercion means, over which those who are to be included cannot have a 
say? This is the criticism made by Paulina Ochoa of Habermas’s understanding of dynamic con-
stitutionalism. The “all affected interests principle,” Ochoa writes, could indeed be a principle for 
democratic inclusion, but only when “individuals living on either side [of the boundary] could 
agree on an analysis and interpretation of the meaning of ‘having one’s interests affected by a 
decision.’”92 In cases where such an agreement is not available prior to the decision for inclu-
sion—as is the case with constitutionalism beyond the nation-state—reliance on the principle 
catches in a vicious circle. To deploy the “all affected interests principle” means already to have 
made a preceding judgment about the nature and scope of the decision such that those affected 
individuals could be included in the decision-making process; however, these same individuals 
could not have themselves been involved in making this prior determination. The exercise would 
thus become one of “constitutional paternalism,” as Ochoa terms it, where the appeal for inclusion 
is made by a group already established in power who cannot help but treat others unequally as 
they were not included in defining the terms of the very principles for their inclusion.93 
The problem with relying on principled inclusion is that it risks a deceptive kind of formalism. 
Legality—from which solidarity was meant to emerge—instead reduces to a formulaic “rule” that 
obscures—and thereby insulates from scrutiny—the background presumptions and relations 
upon which it is predicated. Law becomes a disciplinary, not a critical, force. This betrays what 
Patchen Markel has critiqued as an “orientation toward mastery” that in fact is left unaltered, 
91See Sussan Fratzke, Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. EUR. 18  
(2015) (“Despite increasing evidence of failings in Italy’s asylum procedures, for example, most asylum authorities have been 
hesitant to use the logic of the CJEU’s decision in N.S./M.E. to refrain from transferring claims to Italy. In Austria asylum 
authorities have declined to do so on the grounds that, since the Commission has not instituted infringement procedures, Italy 
is still fulfilling its obligations under EU law. The ECtHR also found, in 2013, that returns to Italy were permissible in specific 
cases.”). 
92PAULINA OCHOA, THE TIME OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: PROCESS AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 42 (2011). 
93Id. 
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unmodulated by the principle of solidarity.94 This form of legalism suppresses precisely what sol-
idarity aims to redress: The “experience of vulnerability, to the fact that our identities are shaped in 
part through the unpredictable responses of other people.”95 The push of legality here demands 
that “others recognize us as who we already really are.”96 It thereby preserves the “basic aspiration 
behind [sovereign] agency: the aspiration to be able to act independently, without experiencing life 
among others as a source of vulnerability, or as a site of possible alienation or self-loss.”97 
This critique is important to bear in mind. If the prohibition on transfer in these circumstances 
is often viewed as an important first step, it nevertheless represents a rather passive and limited 
understanding of what solidarity demands. Consider here how, in requiring a refusal of transfer, 
Dublin III also sanctioned a kind of withdrawal, where responsibility of Member States to the 
rights of asylum seekers was understood in isolation, despite the systemic entanglement of states 
and their—mutually implicated—factual capacities to respond to asylum claims. Relying on 
Dublin’s “sovereignty clause,” the basis for this “corrective” solidarity emphasizes a state’s discre-
tion to act on its own. It thus implicitly, though decisively, affirms a solipsistic ideological conceit 
privileging a national frame for responsibility under European refugee law. 
This national frame can bear ambiguous results from the perspective of rights protection—some 
to heighten protection and others to reduce it. Earlier in the history of the AFSJ, for example, states in 
certain circumstances refused to recognize the asylum jurisdiction of fellow Member States—on the 
basis not of a new prospective legal agreement of humanitarian standards—but instead on account 
of their own criteria of refugee status and protection defined under national law. This was the 
approach of the UK Court of Appeals in 1999 when it denied transfer by the Home Office of asylum 
seekers to French and German jurisdiction on grounds that the latter’s more restrictive policies failed 
to offer asylum, unlike the United Kingdom, on grounds of persecution by agents other than the 
state.98 But this same national frame also bears fruit, as it did after NS/ME, in the discretionary 
reluctance to apply the “systemic deficiencies” test to other states undergoing difficulties of 
adequately protecting refugee rights—and thus to keep “trusting” their deficient asylum laws. 
In either case, there nonetheless remains an elision of transformative post-national solidarity, 
as the national state exercises extensive power by continuing to “draw upon a history of relatively 
stabilized relations of recognition.”99 These relations enable the national state to “set the terms of 
exchanges of recognition, creating incentives for people to frame their claims about justice in ways 
that abet rather than undermine the project of state sovereignty.”100 Under the auspices of mutual 
trust, European states have long avoided confronting the ways individual national legal cultures 
and particular practices developed—and the ways these developments affected one another. With 
regard to the Dublin Regulation’s structure and its rule on the “first country of entry,” in particu-
lar, this permitted core states to ignore increased pressures on the national legal systems of states 
on the periphery, all the while continuing to formally abide by their rights obligations. More 
deeply still—as NS/ME and the Dublin III reform demonstrate—some states were thereafter per-
mitted, under the guise of rebalancing the principle of mutual trust, to continue to “set the terms” 
for others—whether peripheral states or asylum seekers themselves—of equality and participation 
in deciding where claims to asylum are to be processed. 
While formal inclusion in new discursive practices—including new framework agreements for 
more equitable allocation of responsibility—may certainly produce substantial recognition of pre-
viously ignored persons or claims, it would be too hasty to conclude that this secures a robust 
grounding for post-national solidarity. Indeed, the opposite may very well be the case: 
94See PATCHEN MARKELL, BOUND BY RECOGNITION 12 (2003). 
95Id. at 14. 
96Id. 
97Id. at 12. 
98R v. Sec. of State for Home Dept., 1999 INLR 472 (U.K.); Lavenex, supra note 49, at 772. 
99MARKELL, supra note 94, at 30. 
100Id. 
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Progress toward inclusion might instead continue to privilege—in ways remaining hidden and unad-
dressed—assumptions about the nature of national prerogative (an ideology that captures the under-
lying desires for control) in a manner that in fact inhibits solidaristic affirmation of others. 
The relation between mutual trust as a dynamic balance of agreement and forbearance here 
becomes troublingly confused. It sheds its capacity to tender relations of mutual learning and 
mutual examination as a transformative “transfer” of sovereignty from which post-national solid-
arity emerges. If the first case suggests a concern that state power might “collude”101 to lower rights 
protection, as the UK Home Office had attempted, Dublin III’s indeterminacy in the second case 
poses the opposite problem—precisely the absence of state coordination to identify foreseeable 
violations of rights. 
Both cases purport to resolve the tension between mutual trust and fundamental rights by in 
fact deepening the tension between mutual trust and the dynamic production of solidarity through 
law. This drives a wedge between accounts of what states owe to refugees and what they owe to one 
another. Recall that in NS/ME, the Court declined to develop an interpretation of solidarity as a 
legal principle. This oversight now comes hardly as a surprise given the Court’s reliance on 
national discretion to resolve the case. In its formalistic understanding of how rights would 
now have to be protected—in the creation of a new rule, it failed to scrutinize the systemic 
imbalances among states that would continue to dictate that rule’s interpretation and enforcement 
and that would themselves remain unchallenged by that rule. 
Occluded in this discussion is scrutiny of what is in fact a constitutive relationship between 
fundamental rights protection and the fairness with which systemic responsibilities are distributed 
under Dublin among Member States. While rulings like MSS and NS/ME are of course meant to 
ease pressure on peripheral states, they do so obliquely—that is, without directly elaborating how 
mutual trust as the basis of solidaristic relations is predicated, not just on fundamental rights pro-
tection, but on the system’s fair distribution of competencies and capacities, as well. This elision 
masks the true nature of the underlying deficit of solidarity—and thus hinders introspection into 
the causes for why differing and inadequate standards of reception and detention continue to exist 
among European states. More to the point, they disfavor introspection about the role distributive 
injustice might play in the preservation of such differences. They thus fail to make crucial con-
nections between failures of protection in individual cases with broader structural failure in sol-
idaristic relations between states. Missing, therefore, is a coordination of a specific kind, not the 
collusion of national state power but a framework for mutual critique—one that is not reducible to 
the creation of new formal criteria for trusting or suspending trust. 
The principle of mutual trust as we find it today continues to risk violating the fundamental rights 
of individuals—and not just their safety and security before refoulement or ill treatment. It also risks 
violating the very status of those rights as discrete claims to which one must respond and remain 
responsive. The system of mutual trust risks projecting, before the fact, certain interpretations of 
what any claim to protection already means in the context of the Dublin system. Thus a key violation 
also occurs in the very presumptive framing of the right that is meant to be secured—distributed and 
parceled as it is among Member States in the difficult ways I have been describing. 
This concern reflects something rather poignant about the interconnection between the fates of 
national democratic states and of those seeking asylum at their shores. Does not an analogous trap, 
then, confront a Member State within the structure of mutual trust as does the refugee in the 
procedures of her reception? In other words, a form of conditional trust or conditional “hospital-
ity” that a priori structures the encounter in favour of those with discretion? As Jacques Derrida 
memorably argued, the stranger “must ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not 
his own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the 
authorities.”102 And here, the choice of the refugee to select the conditions under which she is 
101See Nicolaidis, supra note 52, at 690. 
102JACQUES DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY 15 (2000). 
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to be admitted and to live—as much as the choice of the peripheral state to similarly select on its 
own the structural context in which Dublin’s rules are applied—is constrained. Without presum-
ing to equate the gravity of these constraints, they nevertheless indicate how deeply the task of 
103solidarity runs along both dimensions at once. In responding to the claims of refugees, 
Member States and European citizens in this respect fail to see the “refugees” that they, too, are. 
If realizing solidarity first entails inquiry into what is owed to one another, it also then entails 
scrutinizing the grounds upon which the former judgment is to be made. The method of scrutiny 
offered by the framework of mutual trust—with its enduring emphasis on the formal character of 
agreement and its derogations—remains inadequate for this kind of second order critique and 
self-critique. It neglects the background orientations that either inhibit critique or make it pos-
sible. These ultimately concern the nature of systemic entanglements in which we always already 
find ourselves—that is, the ongoing ways states affect one another’s capacity to conceptualize and 
to affirm fundamental rights for those who encounter state power. Solidarity requires precisely 
this willingness to unsettle the terms upon which we “already are.” 
E. Solidarity as Fallibilism and Responsiveness: The Structural Possibilities of the 
Particular Case 
If the demands of legal solidarity cannot be captured adequately by recourse to the formalism of 
rule-following, what does this mean for the ways post-national solidarity might yet overcome the 
ideology of sovereignty as the orientation toward “mastery” or “control”? An essential lesson of 
the above dilemmas of mutual trust seems first to be that post-national solidarity requires a spe-
cific sensitivity—one focused on how the nature and structure of coercion are relational, systemic, 
and changing. In this regard, such sensitivity must track how perceived inadequacies in another’s 
law might always reflect inadequacies in one’s own law and how systemic failings structure one’s 
capacities and freedom. Such an orientation is a critical component for solidarity among peoples 
precisely because sensitivity to such processes complicates and resists the aspiration simply to act 
either on the formal presumption of agreement or on the basis of one’s own prerogative. 
On this view, solidarity as a mode of legal integration cannot simply affirm a kind of loyalty codi-
fied by respect for the abstract rules of EU law. Instead, post-national solidarity—precisely as this 
dialectical, systemic critique—requires a certain kind of legal responsibility that reflects (a) terms of 
mutual dependency and mutual responsibility, and, just as importantly, (b) a dynamic responsive-
ness to how such responsibility evolves outside of one’s control and thus requires critical re-
interpretation over time. This second element has been neglected in the cases above. But it is crucial 
for understanding the constitutional character of solidarity as a structure of political responsibility— 
responsibility for the ongoing decisions one is able to take and the grounds on which one takes them. 
Violeta Moreno-Lax has recast the principle solidarity in the context of asylum law and Article 
80 TFEU in terms of a “double-fairness”: fairness at once to the refugee applicant and to fellow 
Member States. It should “permeate the [Common European Asylum System] on a permanent, 
ex ante basis and thus guarantee[] cooperation and sharing of burdens in compliance with 
fundamental rights.”104 This is a persuasive, elegant interpretation of what is immediately, and 
in the first instance, needed as a matter of positive asylum law. But is it sufficient as an account 
of solidarity’s place in European constitutional theory more broadly? 
103This an insight Advocage General Mengozzi also reflects upon in his recent opinion on the obligation under EU law to 
issue humanitarian visas to those seeking asylum. See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-638/16, X and X v. État 
belge ECLI:EU:C:2017:93 (2017), para. 174 (“In extreme conditions such as those that the applicants have endure . . . their 
option to choose is as limited as the option of the Member States of the Mediterranean Basin to turn themselves into land-
locked countries.”). 
104Violeta Moreno-Lax, Solidarity’s Reach: Meaning, Dimensions and Implications for E.U. (External) Asylum Policy 24(5) 
MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. LAW 740, 740-762 (2017). 
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Moreno-Lax’s application of Article 80 to the demands of the CEAS is relatively clear in its 
normative obligations; it creates a new framework for the equitable sharing of the burdens of asy-
lum processing and for upholding fundamental rights standards. But it remains insufficient in the 
following respect: the assessment both of what it means to “share” burdens and to uphold fun-
damental rights is, as we have seen, a deeply contested and evolving affair. It implicates processes 
of judgment and questions of how one understands and interprets one’s normative obligations. 
The appeal to “fairness” as a moral category cannot presume, on its own, to resolve either under-
lying conflicts of interpretation or, with Markell, the underlying orientations toward “mastery” 
and efforts to isolate oneself from vulnerability that endure—even as states might come to agree-
ments that go beyond narrow national self-interest. The structural imbalances, in other words, 
remain; and solidarity must aspire to more than a new formal rule determining the equitable dis-
tribution of asylum seekers.105 
If solidarity as “double fairness” appears too positivistic to inform European constitutional 
politics, let me explore a complementary, though distinct formulation. We might instead see solid-
arity as a principle in the meaning of Herman Heller’s “fundamental ethical principles of law,” 
which provide “the doorway through which positively valued social reality daily makes its way into 
the normativity of the state.”106 Such principles, as David Dyzenhaus has explained, are “supra-
positive in the sense of being beyond positive law, [b]ut they are not supracultural—they are prin-
ciples which formulate the values embedded in our cultural practices which the Rechtsstaat 
institutionalizes.”107 
Post-national solidarity would assume a particular meaning, with emphasis on the manner in 
which a community accepts the heterogeneity and differentiation of its world, how it approaches 
that world in the spirit of shared commitment. I mean this in two ways. First, solidarity describes 
cohesion with a view of its conditioning limit and with the consciousness that this limit is itself a 
contested site of politics. The boundary line is the foundation but also always the contingent result 
of (unpredictable) political action.108 Second, in addition to rejecting any “naturalized” closure of a 
polity’s terms of inclusion and recognition, solidarity recasts the manner in which a polity under-
stands itself to act and, therefore, the image it has of its sovereignty. Sovereignty here refers not 
merely to the sociological capacity of the state for control—which has indeed diminished under 
globalization109 —nor to ultimate political authority, which, to the contrary, has remained as sym-
bolically powerful as ever, but rather to the project of insulating oneself, asymmetrically and at the 
expense of others, from the shared vulnerability and plurality110 of the world. Solidarity in this 
light would scrutinize how disagreements among polities concerning their normative obligations 
might always reflect certain inadequacies in one’s own laws and in underlying systemic failings to 
equitably share not just responsibilities but also one’s vulnerabilities. 
I. “Positive Possibility” and Different Futures 
A key conceptual move is to see how this more sensitive scrutiny is essentially related to fallibilism 
in legal judgment—the idea that each particular case might illuminate needed reforms in the 
existing structure of law. Solidarity, then, emerges through law insofar as legal judgment is able 
105See, e.g., Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631, para. 252 
(establishing that “the Council, when adopting the contested decision [on refugee relocation from Italy and Greece to other 
Member States], was in fact required . . . to give effect to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility . . . .”). 
106Hermann Heller, Staalsleltre (Theory of the State) in GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 302, 371 (Tubingen 1992). 
107DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN, AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 204 
(1997). 
108See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE OTHER HEADING: REFLECTIONS ON TODAY’S EUROPE (P. A. Brault & M. Naas trans., 1992). 
109See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
110See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 234, 244 (1958) (calling sovereignty and the desire for it “contradictory 
to the very condition of plurality” and to the unpredictability to which it gives rise.). 
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to remain responsive to the particularity of the individual case. In what follows, I attempt to 
outline preliminary steps to see how fallibilism is what underwrites the integrity of the “double 
fairness” of one’s law at any point in time, as the normative interpretations of what it requires are 
constantly called to reassessment. 
Recall that Habermas based his theory of constitutional patriotism on a dynamic account of 
constitutionalism, in which norms would be “fallible and revisable.”111 But just what kind of 
fallibilism is meant, and does it in truth satisfy the ambitions of post-national solidarity as a constitu-
tional legal principle? Nikolas Kompridis helpfully distinguishes the “fallibilistic consciousness of 
sciences” from the distinctive fallibilism of “modernity’s relation to time.”112 The former recognizes 
that any claim to validity may require revision in the future, depending on the discovery of “new 
evidence, new arguments, and new experiences.”113 Kompridis argues that such fallibilistic con-
sciousness considers the future to hold a negative possibility, a possibility of “disconfirmation” of 
a claim to which one confidently subscribes in the present. “If an agent has good reasons to 
believe p, she does not look to the future in hopeful anticipation of reasons to reject p, for such 
an orientation would not be consistent with what it means to have good reasons for believing 
p.”114 By contrast, modernity’s time-consciousness orients itself to the future in a positive manner, 
“expectant” of a “future different from the past.”115 Only in this case is the future conceived as a 
“horizon of possibility” that shapes “our responsiveness to present possibility.”116 
On this view, a central aspect of the legal process, in which norms are subsequently tested is not 
to refine their certitude, but to demonstrate how their possibility has not yet been articulated—not 
117just unrealized or imperfectly realized, but in fact not yet recognized for what it might mean. 
The case is not an occasion to perfect, but a hope to search for something otherwise. One perceives 
norms through confrontation with the concrete historical struggles that activate them—and in 
whose particular exigencies they must be interpreted again. 
To think otherwise would subsume application of norms in adjudication to the existing legis-
lative process as it already is, and thereby deprive adjudication of its jurisgenerative, norm-creative 
potential. Because backwards projection to the “pure norm” threatens a timeless—and thus 
unchanging—conception of normative meaning, it undermines the creative life of constitutional 
law and its potential to sustain post-national solidarity. This “defensive” posture of legal solidarity 
so defined reduces legal process to social maintenance, not transformation. 
Early interpretations of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice were predicated on precisely 
this view. Recall that, prior to the intervention of the MSS and NS/ME lines of jurisprudence, early 
interpretations of mutual trust maintained that national courts should not scrutinize the factual 
respect for fundamental rights in a given case where enforcement of another Member State’s laws 
is required. Adopting Halberstam’s metaphor, this “wholesale” approach took another’s laws at 
their normative face-value as a formal system; mutual trust was a veil that adjudication was not 
meant to pierce.118 As Luisa Marin argues, a “gap in legal accountability” emerged “because a 
national court should always control, to some extent, the legality of an act of transfer.”119 But 
not only this. The wholesale approach disappoints, too, because it fails to treat seriously the case 
111HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 384. 




116Id. at 180–81. 
117See, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A  THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 189 (2001). 
118Daniel Halberstam, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the 
Way Forward, 15 GERMAN L. J. 133 (2015). 
119Luisa Marin, “Only You”: The Emergence of a Temperate Mutual Trust in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and Its 
Underpinning in the European Composite Constitutional Order, 2 EUR. PAPERS 141, 149 (2017). 
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in the fallibilistic register. It fails to see the case as an occasion to test the meaning of norms in 
search of a positive possibility in both the host and recipient states’ laws. 
This undermines the moment of encounter and obscures the historical and contingent nature of 
that prior point of democratic legitimation. New claims, when they arise before us, challenge the deter-
minacy of existing norms. Only once they are acknowledged to do so can they become the subjects of 
re-cognition, reconstruction, and judgment in a process that would enlarge the space of public reasons 
under law.120 This is the direction in which we must press Habermas’s own moving ambition to “real-
ize rights anew in  changing  circumstances, . . .  and to draw out  [their] contents more radically.”121 
We see this problem more clearly when we understand that, even following MSS and NS/ME— 
as decisive as they were in their changes of EU law’s posture toward mutual trust—the “wholesale” 
metaphor of adjudication continued in large part to control. Remember that the Court in MSS 
emphasized that Belgium would itself need to “verify how the Greek authorities applied their legis-
lation on asylum” and that the applicant could not be “expected to bear the entire burden of 
proof.”122 But the question remained open as to what proper standard of scrutiny must be applied 
to the case at hand. The subsequent ruling by the European Court of Justice that Member States 
must deny the transfer of an asylum seeker where “they cannot be unaware that systemic defi-
ciencies in the asylum procedure” hardly dispelled the wholesale packaging of claims; to the con-
trary, it confirmed it.123 The appeal to systemic deficiencies meant that courts deferred in the 
individual case not to its particularities but to the generic character of another’s legal system. 
That this judgment was insufficiently robust was subsequently confirmed when states failed to 
coherently abide by the new terms of formal agreement—and the balance between agreement 
and forbearance again remained normatively questionable. 
II. Fallibilist Openings 
Here the notion of fallibilism again gains purchase. If the new standard of formal recognition 
demanded that mutual trust also inquire whether fundamental rights are systematically protected, 
fallibilism revises the manner in which that scrutiny is conducted and the manner in which the 
presumption to mutual trust may be overturned. A key question in this regard for courts has been 
whether to grant individualized review of the case beyond the “wholesale” approach sanctioned by 
the standard of “systemic deficiencies.” Understanding the case in light of fallibilism and respon-
siveness militates in favor of recentering individual claims in a particular way—understanding the 
individual case to have bearing not only on the state of fundamental protection abroad, but also on 
the state of the European Union as a whole and its own normative standards by which such pro-
tection can responsibly be judged. 
Fallibilism redefines what mutual trust as a process of engagement—that balance between 
agreement and forbearance—aims to accomplish. To center the case as an occasion to learn means 
one must sustain a particular dialogue with overarching ambitions and sensitivities. It alters the 
posture of adjudication to reflect the finitude and partiality of one’s existing principles and to 
tender new interpretations of them in light of a particular case. The rebuttal of mutual trust is 
viewed not as merely a possibility to disconfirm something “there,” but rather an opportunity 
to inquire more deeply about what might be there. It becomes a powerful and individualized 
way to press fellow Member States to better respect the rights of asylum seekers, in ways that 
are not always clear before they have been subject to careful adjudication; and concurrently to 
realize the need for reliable structures of responsibility-sharing among states in the Dublin system. 
120See Kompridis, supra note 112, at 136. 
121HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 384. 
122MSS v. Belgium and Greece, para. 358. 
123Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, NS v. Secretary of State for the Home, 2011 ECR I-13905, para. 106. 
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This fallibilist approach entails the shift, then, from a “wholesale” to a “retail” method of 
inquiry. And we see, in fact, the European judiciary responding to such need in its most recent 
case law in the field of asylum. In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights 
departed from its MSS “systemic deficiencies” standard and required that Swiss authorities obtain 
“individual guarantees . . . that the applicants would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the 
age of the children and that the family would be kept together.”124 The decision was guided in part 
by sensitivity to the specific vulnerabilities of the applicants, understood in light of the kind of 
treatment they might likely face if not afforded a stricter non-refoulement review of their pending 
transfer. The Court there responded to two dimensions of rights protection: (1) the particular 
position of the individuals involved and their vulnerability; and (2) the particular “patchwork” 
of rules that asylum seekers factually encounter in the European legal space—in this instance 
prompted by Switzerland’s status as a non-EU Member State.125 
The CJEU soon followed suit in the case CK and Others v. Slovenia, which mandated that 
Slovenian authorities assess the risk to which a woman affected by mental disease would likely 
be exposed both during and after her prospective transfer to Croatia, despite no apparent struc-
tural inadequacy of the latter’s asylum system.126 The judgment in CK is especially notable for the 
direction in which its interpretation of legal principle runs. The Court places added responsibility 
to the discretionary “sovereignty” clause Dublin III’s Article 17, paragraph 1 by offering an expan-
sive reading of the prior NS/ME criteria found in Article 3, paragraph 2. And it does so in light of 
the challenges asylum seekers face in the particular case at hand. It affirms that responsibilities 
attending a state’s discretionary judgment must thereby remain open. States must be responsive to 
assessing the factual potential for concrete applicants to secure realization of their fundamental 
rights, the meaning of which will depend upon their particularized level of needed care. 
This individualized review thereby reflects the positive inflection of fallibilism as an under-
standing of what it means to adjudicate the meaning and scope of rights as such. The context 
of the particular case does not merely tender the semantic material from which normative claims 
are made. Rather, it is constitutive of this normativity, for only by inquiring into the claims to 
particular harm can we understand the normative meaning of rights with new determinacy. 
Otherwise, they would express norms too abstract to teach us much about what to do politically. 
The right that is to be protected “lives” only in a sequence of such determinations. 
This form of judicial review asks the Court to peer more deeply into the particularities of how 
fellow jurisdictions implement principles and policy—as individuals engage in the concrete 
demands placed upon them by interwoven European asylum procedures. European asylum 
law here becomes much more than a set of normative expectations or, even, procedures with “sys-
temic” characteristics. Looking past the normative or systemic character of law requires one to 
understand the background conditions—whether hermeneutic understandings of principles or 
distributions of practical capacity—for the realization of rights in practice. And through this proc-
ess one can come to understand both the normative soundness and factual adequacy of the legal 
standards contained in mutual recognition instruments. 
III. Dialogic and Democratic Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation-State 
Such dynamic formulations of what rights protection demands can then also inspire the dynamic 
justificatory discourses in the broader public sphere. Rulings of the Court are the starting point, 
not the conclusion, of renewed political deliberation over the correct balance under mutual trust, 
124Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, (2014), para. 122. 
125See Evelien Brouwer, Mutual Trust and Human Rights in the AFSJ: In Search of Guidelines for National Courts, 1 EUR. 
PAPERS 893, 919 (2016). 
126ECJ, Case C-578/16 PPU, CK, HF, and AS v. Republic of Slovenia, ECLI:EU:C:2017:127 (Feb. 16, 2017), https://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&td=ALL&num=C-578/16%20PPU. 
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given the evolution of one’s understanding of the meaning and implementation of rights. 
Fallibilism reflects a certain mode of “governance”127 under mutual trust, in which courts scru-
tinize the myriad ways rights might fail to protect (politically under-represented) individuals or 
groups in particular cases—and then uses this as a basis for renewed democratic contestation over 
the proper bounds of policy and principle. Here, public debate evaluates national standards, but 
also conducts comparative inquiry into fellow Member States’ and European law. The process 
begins not from first principles but from the particular constellations of fact and failures to protect 
that require one to reassess what fundamental guarantees require. This is, in the end, why both 
legitimacy and solidarity are so deeply interwoven with fallibilistic responsiveness. 
In such a view, courts would work to disclose new possibilities through their encounters with the 
case that in turn would prompt—and require—a new legislative process of ethical transformation. 
This inter-connection between adjudication and legislation is essential to the “learning process” of 
the democratic constitutional state. The case expected as a site of (positive) possibility might always 
disclose to us something new about the state of our world and, in turn, something in our existing 
norms we previously failed to see or understand. Perhaps it will illuminate those ways we fail to be 
sufficiently attentive to one another’s needs and interests, indeed, attentive to what our own personal 
needs and interests might in fact be, or become. Because a confrontation would thereby require 
something of us as citizens, the case in constitutional adjudication would also have bearing on 
the need for renewed discourses of justification. Constitutional adjudication would thereby represent 
a commitment to see the law grow democratically in the wake of the court’s judgment. 
Depending on how one perceives the burdens of this assessment, the fallibilistic presumption of 
mutual trust implicitly and potentially might always in fact give way. The principle of mutual trust, 
properly read in its capacity to generate solidarity through law, requires this possibility. Abiding 
by a principle of solidarity, the transfer state would in fact bear a burden to assess and, further, to 
aim to remedy the deficiencies in asylum procedures among recipient states. But this assessment 
cannot be understood as merely a license for withdrawal and the discretionary act of national 
sovereignty, as before. In its responsiveness to fact, it cannot aim to react and compensate for 
prior deficiencies of a framework it intends simply to refine. 
Solidarity’s dialogue is more demanding than better inclusion into the existing set of affairs, in 
which national prerogatives are relatively fixed and stable. In triggering sovereign discretion, post-
national solidarity also changes the expectations of who and what is sovereign in light of the inter-
connected causes of failure in the particular case. Sovereignty is invoked here not in the interest of 
defending national prerogatives in isolation, but to engage in an ongoing dialogic assessment of 
the meaning of fundamental rights that activate the need for this discretion. This kind of respon-
siveness cannot be reduced to formal criteria because it responds to conditions that are always 
changing—just as the realization of rights always demands we attend to new meanings of those 
rights and new constellations of facts that impede their realization. These are conditions over 
which we cannot presume to exercise control. And in this space, the renewed dynamic balance 
of agreement and forbearance in mutual trust again finds its place. 
Assessing the fairness of such balance—whether it abides by the fair sharing of responsibilities 
among states or does enough to protect rights of asylum seekers—is predicated upon responsive-
ness to an unpredictable evolution of factual situations. These not only continually unsettle our 
confidence that fairness has been achieved but, more deeply and importantly, also our under-
standing of what fairness as a principle means and might yet mean. For this reason, in the context 
of ongoing reforms to the Dublin system, the appeal by Visegrad states for a highly discretionary 
mechanism of “flexible, effective solidarity” is manifestly inadequate.128 But unsatisfactory, too, 
are frameworks for emergency relocation measures, increased European financial contributions, 
127See generally Maduro, supra note 51, at 815. 
128See Council of the European Union, Solidarity and Responsibility in the Common European Aslyum System, Progress 
Report by Slovak Presidency, Council Doc. 15253/16. 
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and European Asylum Support Office assistance.129 Both cases take far too much for granted the 
underlying distributions of state responsibility and think hardly at all about the need for new 
structural arrangements prompted by new interpretations of rights—interpretations that would 
reach to the heart of the EU’s carrier sanctions regime and requirements of its humanitarian visa 
obligations, to take two examples.130 A solidaristic approach cannot reduce merely to improving 
the “effectiveness” of existing schemes of protection; it must also reflect a deliberative structure 
that questions precisely the background presumptions about what “effective protection” means as 
a legal and practical matter in the world. 
IV. Setting One’s Law Adrift: Further Contexts 
Such an approach, of course, is not limited to the context of asylum. And, indeed, the CJEU has 
applied the individualized nature of judicial review also to mutual trust cooperation in criminal 
matters under the AFSJ. In Aranyosi, the adequacy of prison conditions in Hungary and Romania 
prompted concern for violations of the prohibition of torture and other inhuman, degrading treat-
ment, and the Court on that basis accepted exceptional limitations to the lawfulness of European 
Arrest Warrant extraditions.131 The Court there developed a two-prong test to ascertain whether 
fundamental rights are compromised: first, an assessment of the general operational adequacy of 
the justice system in the issuing state and the “real risk” of a breach of fundamental rights; and 
second, a specific, individualized assessment of that risk to the individual in the case at hand.132 
Recently, prompted by the ongoing rule of law crises in Hungary, Poland, and other EU Member 
States, the “real risk” test has been applied to scrutinize conditions in which the independence of the 
judiciary and thus the right to a fair trial might be compromised. In its Celmer ruling, the CJEU 
accepted Aranyosi’s two-prong test in the assessment of “real risks” to the right to a fair trial.133 
Some commentators lamented that the second prong’s individualization requirement, when applied 
to evaluations of judicial independence and prospective judicial procedures, is a “Herculean hurdle” 
so daunting to satisfy that it seems simply to render the test impotent.134 Alternatively, others decried 
Celmer for risking “legal chaos,” as some courts now would “regularly refus[e] to recognize judg-
ments from  courts in Poland” while others would continue to trust them.135 
Nevertheless, these judgments have had remarkable jurisgenerative properties. And these are 
salient to how we might understand the productive creation of solidarity through law as an exer-
cise of responsiveness. Consider in this regard the recent decision by the Karlsruhe Higher 
Regional Court concerning the extradition from Germany of a Latvian citizen to Poland.136 
137Faced with Celmer’s daunting second prong, the German court submitted to its Polish 
129See Evangelia Tsourdi, Solidarity at Work? The Prevalence of Emergency-Driven Solidarity in the Administrative 
Governance of the Common European Asylum System, 24 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &  COMP. L. 667 (2017). 
130To consider the evaluation of Advocate General Mengozzi concerning the provision of humanitarian visas, see, ECJ, Case 
C-638/16 PPU, X and X v État Belge, ECLI:EU:C:2017:93 (Mar. 7 2017), para. 174, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf? 
language=en&td=ALL&num=C-638/16%20PPU. 
131EJC, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft 
Bremen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198 (Apr. 5 2016). 
132Id. at paras. 88–94. 
133ECJ, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM, 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, (Jul. 25, 2018) paras. 61–68, 
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134See Wouter van Ballegooij & Petra Bárd, The CJEU in the Celmer Case: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back for Upholding 
the Rule of Law within the EU, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 29, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-cjeu-in-the-celmer-case-
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135See R. Daniel Kelemen, Is Differentiation Possible in Rule of Law?, COMP. EUR. POL. (forthcoming). 
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colleagues a list of twelve questions that probed the procedures and guarantees for judicial inde-
pendence.138 These questions inquired into the nature of the appellate process and the compo-
sition of the competent courts, including the background of the Polish judges who were to be 
involved. The German court further pressed their Polish counterparts on the vulnerability of 
the proceedings to the vague, politically tendentious “extraordinary appeal” procedure to the 
Polish Supreme Court. Perhaps most notably, the Karlsruhe Court asked for assurances that 
the Polish government would not initiate disciplinary proceedings against the judges hearing 
the present case. The German court accepted the Polish responses to be “reliable and credible 
enough” to approve the extradition, but included a number of conditions, including the partici-
pation of the German embassy in the trial with access to the accused while in custody.139 
The exchange between the courts—one envisioned by the CJEU in its Aranyosi framework 
requiring requests for supplementary information and “dialogue”140 —is a poignant, if rare exam-
ple of the critical potential of legal procedures to create the kinds of exchanges in law that might 
yet create solidaristic ties. The German court’s approach is noteworthy for its imaginative adju-
dication: the way it harnesses the involvement of other state authorities—both German and 
Polish; the deliberative structure of its examination; and its commitment to provide oversight 
of the proceedings into the future. 
In the context of the broader rule of law crisis, this kind of approach seems novel and salutary. 
It shifts the terms of confrontation to a creative plane—and builds solidarity alongside more puni-
tive, disciplinary measures easily cast as confrontations among Member States or between Poland 
and the European Commission. While these latter kinds of confrontations leave European politics 
vulnerable to the old sovereigntist divisions, the work of the German court breaks free of this logic. 
It presents neither withdrawal from cooperation, nor the insistence of national prerogative—nor 
does it hide behind the formalities of new rules of recognition or seek merely corrective measures. 
Instead, the work here is forward-looking and remains responsive to the evolving facts of the 
case, including the prospective response of Polish institutions—both an aggressive executive, but 
also an embattled and possibly cooperative Polish judiciary. In carefully reasoning through what 
might yet happen, the German court is able to disaggregate Polish state power and to scrutinize 
the Polish executive’s potential intrusion into the legal process while instructing German author-
ities to concretely support the procedures of Polish courts. This ongoing responsiveness results in 
a willingness to press the boundaries of state responsibility and to creatively imagine how ongoing 
dialogue unpredictably shapes the meaning of legal obligation. 
One can imagine a similar process triggered from one Member State to another in light of failures 
in asylum reception and processing, precisely to understand more carefully when the invocation of 
the sovereignty clause is in fact mandated and recognition cannot be granted. This time, the act 
would not be unilateral de-recognition, resulting in no transfer, but also inquiry into the nature 
and cause of the failure to protect rights. In this light, the requirement under EU law to invoke 
the sovereign discretion clause would be based not only on the attribution of failure but also on 
willingness to understand how that failure is already a failure of collective responsibility with causes 
that implicate, too, the broader structural features of the European system—to which the transferring 
state has consented and for which it bears its share of liability. Here, fault would be attributed to the 
receiving state but to the involvement, or lack thereof, of fellow Member States, as well. 
A process like this gets us a good deal closer to understanding how solidarity can be a product 
of law and of legal relationships in a deeply plural European society. In the course of this dialogue, 
legality secures not merely rule-following but a discursive practice of solidarity—in Max 
138Id. at paras. 22–35. 
139 Maximilian Steinbeis, Editorial: Brother’s Keeper, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2019), https://verfassungsblog.de/brothers-
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140Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198 (Apr. 5 2016), paras. 76–77. 
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Steinbeis’s lovely phrase, “a practice of transnational judicial taking care of each other.”141 Taking 
care of one another means inviting mutual surprise and mutual learning—and thus to care for the 
conditions of this learning. To accept that one’s involvement with another might prompt unex-
pected obligations, obligations which might set one, equally unexpectedly, adrift from the settled 
presumptions and insular orientations of one’s own law. Insofar as one is beholden to others as 
they are similarly beholden in return, one becomes aware of the “refugee” one is. And if 
solidarity is the product of law understood to be inflected by the positive possibility of creative 
renewal, then solidarity does not integrate what is already recognized. It becomes creative, trans-
formative—modulating what is into what might yet be. The refugee, of course, by virtue of her 
displacement and exclusion, cannot hope merely to sustain what already is; she must hope to find 
political community anew. 
141Steinbeis, supra note 139. 
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